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general welfare." But as has been pointed out, although the violation
of a statute necessarily affects the public welfare, equity will not ordinarily enjoin such violation unless it is a purpresture, irreparable
m
Injury, or nuisance.u
The court goes far in the instant case in extending the jurisdiction
of equity by allowing the injunction of an unlicensed small loan business. And following the approach that wherever the general welfare
is endangered by criminal acts, or criminal procedure is inadequate to
prevent crime, equity may relieve by injunction, can lead only to the
result that equity could enforce the criminal law as such,1 in disregard
of the constitutional rights guaranteed a defendant in a criminal
prosecution. 7
ALAN ROTH VOGEaE"

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-EJECTMENT BY THE VENDOR.
Plaintiff contracted to sell a house and lot to defendant for the
sum of $2,000, of which $100 was then paid, the remainder to be paid
in monthly installments of $25. Defendant was placed in possession,
agreeing that if he defaulted in his installments, or if he failed to keep
up the insurance, the vendor should have the right to enter and take
possession, and that any payments made under the contract should
remain in the vendor as liquidated damages and rent for the use of the
property. Defendant paid only two of the monthly installments and
defaulted in the payment of the insurance premiums, whereupon the
vendor brought an action of ejectment The court held for the plaintiff because the vendee's payments did not amount to such a sum that
he could be deemed to have acquired a "substantial equitable title" in
the land. Masch not v. Moore, 278 Ky. 36, 120 S.W. (2d) 750 (1938).
The courts in most jurisdictions will entertain an action of ejectment when the vendee has defaulted in the payment of his contract
2
installments.1 The action is essentially a possessory one, and its
"Supra, note 3.
' Courts saying that the basis of equity jurisdiction in this class
of cases is the inadequate remedy at law include Illinois, in People v.
Clark, 268 Ill. 156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915), and Kansas, in State v.
McMahon, supra, note 2. See, also, 2 Story, Equity Juris. (11th ed.
1873), sec. 924. The Kentucky court also follows that trend of reasoning in the Payne case. But see Note, (1931) 20 Ky. L.J. 340; Note,
(1927) 75 Pa. L.R. 73; Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921).
"?People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930) ; State
v. Saunders, 66 N.H. 39, 25 Atl. 588 (1889); State v. Diamint, 73 N.J.L.
131, 62 Atl. 286 (1905); State v. Martin, 77 N.J.L. 652, 73 At. 548
(1909); Heddon v. Hand, 90 N.J. Eq. 583, 107 Atl. 285 (1919); Note,
(1926) 6 Boston U.L.R. 128; and Note, (1920) 20 Col. L.R. 605.
' Burnett v. Caldwell, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 290, 19 L. Ed. 712 (1869);
Goode v. Temple, 221 Ala. 588, 130 So. 202 (1930); Lewis v. Rouse, 29
Ariz. 156, 240 Pac. 275 (1925); Empire Inv. Co. v. Mort, 169 Cal. 732,
147 Pac. 960 (1915); Roller v. Smith, 76 Colo. 371, 231 Pao. 656 (1925);
Drollinger v. Carson, 97 Kan. 502, 155 Pac. 923 (1916); Balesh v. Alcott,
257 Mich. 352, 241 N.W. 216 (1932); Rose v. Loyd, 98 Mo. 253, 11 S.W.
622 (1889); Plet v. Wilson, 134 N.Y. 339, 31 N.E. 336 (1892); Credle v.
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true purpose is to obtain the actual, physical possession of certain real
property.3 That this conception of ejectment is followed in the majority
of states is evidenced by the fact that in allowing the action to the
vendor, no attention is given to the amount already paid by the vendee.'
In such a case the success of that action is determinative of nothing but
the bare right of possession, and the other rights of the parties are not
thereby adjudicated
Kentucky is distinctly in the minority in its prior holdings on the
question and has hitherto not allowed the action in such a case.0 In
Avers, 126 N.C. 11, 35 S.E. 128 (1900); Eldridge v. Vance, 128 Okla. 46,
261 Pac. 168 (1927); Malmstrom v. Second East Apt. Co., 74 Utah 206,
278 Pac. 811 (1929); Reynolds v. Bean, 91 Vt. 247, 99 A+1. 1013 (1917);
Britt v. Bauman, 199 Wis. 514, 226 N.W. 955 (1929).
2
Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618 (1879); Peters
v. Allison, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 232, 36 Am. Dec. 574 (1841); De Bergere
v. Chaves, 14 N.M. 352, 93 Pac. 762 (1908), affd., 231 U.S. 482, 58 L. Ed.
325, 34 S.Ct. 144 (1913).
* Cincinnati v. White, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 431, 8 L. Ed. 452 (1832).
*Burnett
v. Caldwell, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 290, 19 L. Ed. 712 (1869)
($4,000 out of $18,000 paid, and court stated that the fact that the
vendee had paid a large amount was no defense); Lewis v. Rouse, 29
Ariz. 156, 240 Pac. 275 (1925) ($1,500 out of $7,000 paid); Gervaise v.
Brookings, 156 Cal. 103, 103 Pac. 329 (1909) (half of the contract price
was paid, and in addition the land had doubled in value. Court states
that the amount paid by the vendee is immaterial); Hincksman v.
Delacour, 47 Cal. App. 416, 190 Pac. 932 (1920) ($7,000 out of $18,000
paid); Curry v. Curry, 213 Mich. 309, 182 N.W. 98 (1921) (vendee had
paid one-half of contract price); Wright v. Lewis, 323 Mo. 404, 19 S.W.
(2d) 287 (1929) (about one-third paid); Hill v. Buford, 111 Okla. 148,
239 Pac. 163 (1925) ($900 out of $1,500 paid); Malmberg v. Baugh, 62
Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923) ($4,450 out of $10,000 paid); Malmstrom
v. Second East Apt. Co., 74 Utah 206, 278 Pac. 811 (1929) ($7,600 out
of $35,000 paid).
5 The right of possession is determined by the contract and is
independent of other rights accruing by reason of the vendor-purchaser
relationship. In Burnett v. Caldwell, 76 U.S. 290 (1869), after ejectment of the vendee the court said, "Whatever relief the plaintiff in
error may be entitled to must be sought in equity. He can have none
at law." In Hansborough v. Peck, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 497, 506, 18 L. Ed.
520 (1866), in speaking of the vendor's remedies in case of breach by
the purchaser, assumpsit, equitable foreclosure, and ejectment, the
court said of the latter, "In that case, the purchaser by going into a
court of equity within a reasonable time and offering payment of the
purchase-money, together with costs, is entitled to a performance of
the contract". Accord: Taylor v. Longworth, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 172,
10 L. Ed. 405 (1840). Where the purchaser has taken possession under
the contract "his right of possession is lost if he is in default, refusing
to perform the contract or has delayed performance so long that his
Walsh,
right to compel specific performance no longer exists."
A Treatise on Equity (1930) 434 (and citations). For a discussion
of the rights of a vendee after default, see Corbin, Right of Defaulting
Vendee to Restitution of Installments Paid (1931) 40 Yale L.J. 1013.
6The Kentucky court first denied ejectment to the vendor in Morton
v. Dickson, 90 Ky. 572, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 507, 14 S.W. 905 (1890). Since
that case and prior to the present decision the question has arisen
only twice, in the eases of Doty v. Jameson, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 507, 93 S.W.
638 (1906) and Day v. Miles, 204 Ky. 711, 265 S.W. 282 (1924), and in
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Morton v. Dickson, the court said (p. 579) that it would be inequitable
to allow the vendor the right of entry without considering the "value of
the land, the improvements made upon it, or any other equitable right
of the vendee." Similarly, in the principal case' the court says (p. 39)
with reference to those cases where ejectment was not allowed:' "the
sums paid were of such proportion as to constitute penalties if allowed
to be ignored or retained by the vendor." Accordingly it would seem
that the Kentucky court now looks upon an action of ejectment brought
by the vendor as involving something more than the mere right of
possession. In the Morton case by denying ejeetment on the ground
that there would be no consideration of equities which the vendee might
have acquired, and in the instant case by referring to those cases in
which the substantial amount paid by the purchaser would be forfeited
if the action were allowed, the court apparently determines in an ejectment action not only the right of possession, but in addition, all other
rights of the parties and the equitable title to the lands as between
them."
The determination of the equities of the two parties in ejectment
Is certainly a reasonable consequence of a rule which allows the action
where the vendee has made no substantial payment on the purchase
price, and refuses to allow it where by such payment a "substantial
B. H. HExnMD
equitable title" has been acquired.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-LICENSE TAXES-CLASSIFICATION.

The General Assembly imposed graduated license fees on retail
merchants, the amount of tax to be paid by each owner being dependent
upon the number of stores which he operated within the state. Plainboth of those cases the action was denied (in the Doty case with no
mention being made of the equity already acquired by the vendee, and
in the Day case, where the vendee had paid $400 out of a contract price
of $600).
'90 Ky. 572, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 507, 14 S.W. 905 (1890).
'The court in Maschinot v. Moore states that there is no disposition to depart from the rule against allowing ejectment, but states
(p. 38) that "it will be observed from an examination that in each case
of its application [citing Morton v. Dickson, 90 Ky. 572, 12 Ky. L. Rep.
507, 14 S.W. 905 (1890), and Day v. Miles, 204 Ky. 711, 265 S.W. 282
(1924) ], there had been definitely and surely, a transfer or conveyance
to the vendee of a substantial equitable title-just short of the legal
title."
ISupra note 6.
More particularly, those rights adjudicated will include the right
of the vendee to specific performance or to a recission, or his right to
be relieved from a forfeiture (i.e., his right to recover part of the
payments if time is not of the essence, or where time is of the essence,
but his delay is not so serious that equity will not relieve him of his
default). Corbin, supra note 5.
" Kentucky Statutes 1936, Section 4302a-17:
"Every merchant establishing, operating or maintaining one or
more stores, stands or places of business within this State, shall pay
annually the license fee hereinafter prescribed for the privilege of open-

